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to the increasingly prevalent belief that normative moral judg-
ments are matters simply of personal preference. The problem 
of moral skepticism, however, runs deep and wide in American 
culture; it is hardly unique to constitutional theory. For us to 
move beyond the impasse of contemporary constitutional theory, 
we must confront the moral predicament of American society in 
general. We must address the existence and meaning of moral 
truth in the radically pluralistic, and increasingly polarized, soci-
ety in which we live. A daunting challenge, to say the least. 
THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND 
DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS 
JURISPRUDENCE. By Howard Gillman.t Durham, 
N.C.: Duke University Press. 1993. Pp. x, 317. $29.95. 
Herbert Hovenkampz 
Gillman's book is another in a long and growing list of titles 
written in the 1980s and early 1990s designed to illuminate the 
Lochner era in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Gillman is inter-
ested mainly in antecedents, beginning with the Founders and fo-
cusing heavily on the Jackson period. Like most good recent 
writing on this subject, Gillman eschews the use of legal "formal-
ism" as an explanatory paradigm. That notion, that the judges 
were rule-bound lawyers who separated law from policy, explains 
little and is, in any event, wrong. Substantive due process was 
driven by policy concerns just as much as landmark twentieth-
century decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education or Roe v. 
Wade, and the judges who espoused it were a highly creative and 
energetic group. 
Gillman argues that although substantive due process was 
formalized in American constitutional thought in the 1880s and 
after, its presence is detectable much earlier than historians have 
generally realized. Indeed, one can find it as early as the late 
eighteenth century, and it becomes quite visible already in the 
second decade of the nineteenth century. As he notes, the great 
revolution in ideas of free trade that facilitated the rise of the 
Jacksonian movement and an incipient national market created a 
corresponding hostility toward parochial state and local regula-
tions that tended to favor hometown businesses at the expense of 
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others, or to impose unreasonable burdens on those engaged in 
various enterprises. The result was that already in the 1810s and 
1820s numerous courts began to read "reasonableness" require-
ments into regulatory provisions that, on their face, seemed to 
state absolute prohibitions. For example, in 1828, in Vadine's 
Case,3 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a 
law preventing unlicensed persons from removing waste materi-
als or other filth from dwelling houses must be read to prevent 
them only if they acted unreasonably in the process. 
The essentially Jacksonian origins of Gilded Age substantive 
due process has been known for some time. For example, those 
who have studied the work of Thomas M. Cooley, whose treatise 
on Constitutional Limitations (1868)4 became a manifesto for 
Lochner jurisprudence, have often noted his strongly Jacksonian 
commitments. But on this point Gillman goes even earlier, trac-
ing the origins of substantive due process to the Jackson era's 
market revolution itself. 
As Gillman notes, Marshall era "vested rights" jurispru-
dence, which used the Contract Clause as the most aggressive 
protector of liberties, took a serious beating during the Jackson 
era. Indeed, conservatives viewed such Jacksonian decisions as 
the Charles River Bridge case (1837)5 as emasculating the con-
tract clause. Of course, this was done with good reason: those 
who could claim "vestedness" as the source of their rights were 
invariably the privileged who had acquired promises from the 
sovereign to begin with. Rhetorically, at least, the Jackson move-
ment represented the triumph of those who sought to undermine 
the concept of privilege. 
But the failure of vestedness mandated the substitution of a 
different source for political liberties-and, in this case, one that 
was more general, in that it did not depend on the state's former 
largesse. One problem with the vested rights doctrine was that 
the only persons who could claim it were those who had a vested 
right to begin with. The Jacksonian concept of individual rights 
was much more universal, to be asserted without regard to ear-
lier grants of largesse from the sovereign. Unfortunately, there 
was not very much in the pre-Civil War Constitution from which 
such rights could be inferred. Judges began to find it, Gillman 
argues, in "an aversion to factional or class politics." That is to 
say, substantive due process grew out of a kind of early public 
3. 6 Pick (23 Mass.) 187 (1828). 
4. Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which Rest upon 
the Legislative Power on the States of the American Union (Little, Brown, 1868}. 
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Pet.) 420 (1837). 
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choice theory that was deeply suspicious of the regulatory pro-
cess, inclined to see it as favoring special interests at the expense 
of the public, and willing to use judtcial power to strike down the 
resulting legislation even if there was no identifiable clause in the 
Constitution that forbad the legislation at issue. 
The effect of this interpretation is to make the Lochner era 
look much more creative and constructive than reactionary. 
Probably the most common explanation of Lochner other than 
the "legal formalism" explanation is Holmes's explanation that it 
was a reactionary period in which conservatives responded to so-
cialism, the labor movement, and Progressive politics by ignoring 
their concerns and aligning themselves with the propertied inter-
ests to which the new movements were opposed. However, the 
movement began to take on a reactionary cast because the free 
market principles that it professed were challenged by a Progres-
sive regime whose confidence in the equanimity of the market 
was very much in doubt. As Gillman puts it, the ideology of sub-
stantive due process was fairly inclusive, or egalitarian in the 
early nineteenth century, but as the market increasingly pro-
duced maldistributions of wealth it became increasingly exclu-
sive. In that sense, the "story of the Lochner era is a story about 
judicial fidelity to crumbling foundations, not judicial infidelity to 
recoverable foundations." 
This is a readable book that will enlarge any reader's view of 
the Lochner era, even those who know their constitutional his-
tory well. It makes clear that, for all that has been said of the 
period, there are still worthwhile things to say. 
THE FEDERALIST: DESIGN FOR A CONSTITU-
TIONAL REPUBLIC. By George W. Carey.1 Cham-
paign: University of Illinois Press. 1989. Pp. 181. $22.95. 
Michael P. Zuckertz 
George Carey has been publishing essays on The Federalist 
at least since 1976, and therefore his recent book is rather like a 
nicely aged wine or cheese. The comparison is apt, for the book 
has the kind of delicacy and sureness of touch we associate with a 
high quality burgundy: smooth and flavorful, without being asser-
tive, sharp-edged, or flashy. In a word, Carey's is a mature study 
from which all who are interested in The Federalist can learn 
something. 
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